REVIEW

How to Have a Culture War
Kathryn Abramst
Beyond All Reason: The RadicalAssault on Truth in American
Law. Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry. Oxford University
Press, 1997. Pp 3, 195.
Being a legal scholar is often like living at the last stop on
the subway. The trains all get to you, but by the time they do
they're late, they've been everywhere else first, and everyone is a
little worse for the wear. Thus it should be no surprise that the
culture wars, which have been raging for more than a decade at
colleges and universities nationwide, are finally pulling into our
corner of the academic world. By some lights, the advance troops
arrived long ago. Race- and gender-based critiques of legal doc-

t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I want to thank participants in faculty coloquia at the Cornell Women's Studies Program, Cornell and Notre Dame Law Schools, The
Feminism & Critical Race Theory Workshop at Fordham Law School, and the National
Association of Scholars Meeting for comments on the subject of this Review. Particular
thanks go to Bev Balos, Jonathan Brand, Nancy Cook, Cynthia Farina, Mary Lou Fellows,
Jim Fleming, Katherine Franke, John Garvey, Steve Garvey, Bill Kell, Jon Macey, Linda
McClain, Theresa Phelps, Emily Sherwin, and Ben Zipursky for thoughtful suggestions on
an earlier draft. In the interest of full disclosure, I should acknowledge that I am an occasional target of Farber and Sherry's critique, usually for my work analyzing feminist and
critical race narratives. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Storks, 79 Cal L Rev
971 (1991). It is fair to say, however, that I am not one of the scholars for whom they reserve their most scathing criticism, although I have described and defended the work of
some of those scholars. Although I do not accept the term "radical multiculturalist," see
note 2, 1 would describe myself as a feminist legal scholar whose work has been influenced
by a range of critiques of merit, objectivity, and legal determinacy. I am also a Jew, an
identity that I experience sometimes through religious observance and more often through
a sense of cultural affiliation, but which has always been important to me.
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trine-some of which entail broader methodological challengeshave been flourishing for a decade. But an organized response to
these ideas has been slow to emerge, except at appointments
meetings and around faculty coffeepots. Professors Daniel Farber
and Suzanna Sherry have sought to ameliorate this problem.
Their challenges to the use of narrative and the critique of merit
first moved this debate from faculty lounges to the pages of law
reviews. Now Beyond All Reason, a book-length development of
their ideas, seeks to bring the struggle for the soul of legal academia to a broader audience.
The "culture wars" complaint has become almost a genre in
itself, and this book bears many of its familiar hallmarks. There
is the battle, as the book jacket predictably tells us, between the
"party of reason" and the "party of emotionalism and subjectivity."' There are the stark depictions of the challengers as threatening "civilization as we know it," not, this time, the academic
canon, but Enlightenment epistemology and the concept of merit.
Yet Farber and Sherry, astute observers of this struggle in its
earlier incarnations, have added a few twists of their own. Some
of these relate specifically to the legal context: multiculturalist
critics are charged with employing a "mindset" concept of groupbased prejudice, which encourages more encompassing regulation
of speech and discrimination. Other distinctive features, however,
reflect an effort to redefine the harm, focusing not simply on the
end of civilization as we know it, but on a series of consequences
the multicultural critique threatens to impose on a more particularized target, American Jews. An additional innovation is a
hybrid methodological style, which is itself a commentary on
what has been won and lost as the culture wars have raged on.
In this Review, I will examine Beyond All Reason, with a
particular focus on these distinctive features. I will argue that
they are troubling innovations that reflect a misplaced strategy:
they up the ante, in order to bring the legal culture wars to a
rapid and conclusive resolution. I will argue that it is an errorparticularly this far into the controversy-to seek to resolve the
debate over legal merit and methodology in this way. The multiculturalist challenge has inevitably altered the landscape in
which legal scholars think and Work. The question is not how to
vanquish it at last but how participants might begin to speak to

Farber and Sherry are not, of course, responsible for the wording of their publicity.
The quote comes from Professor Jeffrey Rosen, who could have reached for a less hackneyed locution.

1998]

Culture War

1093

each other across the *chasms of conceptual pluralism that it has
helped to create.

I. COMES THE "PARTY OF REASON"
Farber and Sherry describe the features of an ongoing struggle between "Enlightenment scholars'--a school of academics
who subscribe to objectivist epistemologies, notions of intrinsic
merit, and a belief that legal rules generally determine outcomes-and a group of critics they refer to as "radical multiculturalists."2 The latter group is a subset of feminist, critical race,
and critical legal scholars, who are distinguished from their more
moderate colleagues by their commitment to strong forms of social constructivism and by their attendant desire to alter the
major premises on which legal thought proceeds.
The multicultural critique, as described by Farber and
Sherry, has three main elements: a critique of law, a critique of
merit, and a critique of knowledge or truth. Although each critique has its own distinctive consequences and coloration, they
share certain features that connect them conceptually, and that
2 As this language suggests, Farber and Sherry have learned a rhetorical lesson from
past skirmishes in the culture wars: the importance of claiming for themselves the labels
our society views as legitimating and of assigning to their opponents the labels that have a
subtle (or not so subtle) marginalizing function. See Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing
as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too 102 (Oxford 1994) (arguing that abstract terms
like "free speech" are "political prize[s)," the labels "you want your favorites to wear"). To
style oneself the defender of the Enlightenment tradition is no small advantage when one
is speaking to a mainstream legal, or more general scholarly, audience. Conversely, to describe one's opponents as""radical" is a reliable device for placing them at the margin. See
Urvashi Vaid, Virtual Equality 295, 307-45 (Doubleday 1995) (noting that focus groups
demonstrate highly negative reactions to term "radical" and advocating that gays and lesbians use it to characterize the Christian Right in anti-gay referendum campaigns).
I do not contend that terms like "Enlightenment7 are devoid of substantive content.
The Enlightenment was an identifiable historical period that left us a particular substantive and epistemological legacy, albeit one that has many nuances and can be redefined
and claimed for a variety of purposes. This term, as well as more indeterminate terms like
"radical," also has strong legitimating and delegitimating implications than can be-and
are being in this very case-used to advantage in political argument. With respect to Farber and Sherry's status as Enlightenment heirs, I will satisfy myself with arguing that
their actual methods depart starkly from the standards of rationally elaborated argument
they claim to defend. See Section II.B.3. With respect to their opponents, I will, for purposes of this essay, decline the intentional marginalization conferred by their use of the
term "radical." Farber and Sherry claim to ground their distinction between radical multiculturalists and other multiculturalists in a number of other commentators' observations
(p 16), and there are settings in which "radical" is valorizing. Nonetheless, it is likely that
in a more mainstream appeal like Beyond All Reason, the delegitimating connotations of
the term offer an additional advantage. Because of this, and because I believe that feminists and critical race scholars embody a methodological continuum rather than a stark
distinction between a radical fringe and a rational core, I use the term "multiculturalists"
to refer to the scholars whom Farber and Sherry critique.
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cause them to function synergistically in the work of many multicultural scholars.3 The multiculturalists' claim is that each of
these systems-be it law, meritocracy, or Cartesian epistemology-fails to provide the objective basis for making the distinctions that it promises. Determinations within these systems are
instead driven by relations of power: the self-promotion of more
powerful groups at the expense of the less powerful, or the legitimation of the status quo by those whose interests it serves.4
Legal principles, for example, often "lack the power to compel
a particular conclusion" (p 36).' In some cases, contradictory principles permit the case to be resolved in wholly different ways; in
other cases, even a solitary principle that would seem to control
the case does not, in fact, determine the outcome. Far from being
driven by rules, law is instead "a ramshackle ad hoc affair whose
ill-fitting joints are soldered together by suspect rhetorical gestures, leaps of illogic, and special pleading tricked up as general
rules, all in service of a decidedly partisan agenda..." (p 37)?
The notion of merit is also rejected by multiculturalists, who
quarrel not with a particular version of merit but with the concept itself. Multiculturalists, according to Farber and Sherry,
view merit as a set of criteria formulated according to the characteristics of the powerful, in order to perpetuate their power and
exclude others (pp 31-33). Further, knowledge, like merit, is both
"culturally and ideologically contingent" (p 31) and "socially constructed" (p 27). By these terms, multiculturalists suggest that
what one "knows" or understands to be true about the world is
usually a function of one's group-based experience. Moreover, the
relative privilege of the claimants determines whose claims of
knowledge are ultimately credited by courts, universities, and
other dominant institutions. This makes knowledge, in a quote

' Farber and Sherry acknowledge this synergy in Chapter Six (pp 120-27), but they
note that individual multiculturalists do not necessarily subscribe to each critique (p 121).
" The next three paragraphs reflect my synopsis of Farber and Sherry's synopsis of

the multiculturalist tenets they then proceed to critique. I want to stress, because I diverge from many of Farber and Sherry's characterizations of multiculturalists, see Section
II.B, that the following Section reflects their descriptions, not my own.
' In this paragraph, I describe the elements of the multicultural critique, as they are
described by Farber and Sherry. The quotes are from Farber and Sherry's book, but these
are, in turn, excerpts from the work of various multicultural scholars. For a critique of
Farber and Sherry's approach to excerpting and interpreting the work of multicultural
scholars, see Section II.B.1.

' Quoting Derrick Bell, Who's Afraid of CriticalRace Theory, 1995 U Ill L Rev 893,
899-900. Bell, in turn, is quoting Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech at 21 (cited

in note 2). Bell argues, however, that this view is shared by most critical race theorists (p
159).
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that Farber and Sherry draw from Professor Gary Peller, "a function of the ability of the power to impose their own views" (p 27).'
These critiques are connected to certain substantive and
methodological propositions in the work of many multicultural
scholars. A prominent, and controversial, example is the use of
narrative, or experiential storytelling, in multicultural legal
scholarship.8 This practice draws on two critical epistemological
premises: that knowledge is contingent and shaped by groupbased experience, and that the Enlightenment norm of rationality
should not be uniquely privileged as a mode of knowledge gathering and persuasion.? The use of narrative seeks to impart
group-based knowledge through the ostensibly direct rendition of
experience and to persuade, at least in part, through emotionally
evocative imagery, rather than relying primarily on rational argumentation.
A second proposition that emerges from multiculturalist
premises is the so-called "mindset theory of law" (p 35). Multiculturalists believe, according to Farber and Sherry, that "despite an
appearance of rationality, law is actually driven by unconscious
mindsets or tacit understandings. Because these understandings
are below the level of consciousness, they are initially learnedand can later be changed-through images and stories rather
than through rational argument" (p 35). These beliefs help to
explain why multiculturalists favor storytelling as a mode of legal
persuasion. The consequences of this view, however, extend
beyond the realm of scholarship. The conviction that our view of
the world is shaped by the preconscious images through which we
understand ourselves and others has led multiculturalists to propose change in several areas of discrimination law. The most familiar is the call for regulation of pornography and hate speech.
Commentators such as Professor Catharine MacKinnon argue
that these words and images are dangerous for two reasons.
First, they are capable of socializing women and members of racial and sexual minority groups to views of them as degraded,
Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke L J 758, 806.
" For examples of multicultural scholarship that use narratives as the primary means
of transmitting information or effecting persuasion, see Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of
Race and Rights (Harvard 1991); Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web,
113 Nova L Rev 355 (1989) (providing a narrative of her delivery to suggest the limitations
of legal writing in describing women's experiences).
' For a discussion of the relationship of narrative to the critique of Enlightenment or
Cartesian epistemology, see Kathryn Abrams, The Engagements of FeministLegal Theory,
in Robert W. Gordon and Margaret Jane Radin, eds, A Guide to ContemporaryLegal Theory (forthcoming 1998). I suspect that Farber and Sherry would agree with this analysis,
although they do not articulate it in precisely this way.

1096

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[65:1091

objectified, or inferior. Second, they bypass the conscious level
unmediated by reason. Therefore, these multiculturalists conclude that pornography and hate speech should be regulated,
rather than protected as speech. 0 The so-called "mindset theory"
has also been employed by Professor Charles Lawrence to argue
for the alteration of the discriminatory intent test of Washington
v Davis." Lawrence argues that if a particular act or practice has
a "cultural meaning" that invokes notions of inequality, it carries
a stigma similar, for example, to hate speech or de jure segregation. Accordingly, discriminatory intent should be presumed.
The multicultural approach and the Enlightenment approach, Farber and Sherry conclude, reflect "two fundamentally
contrasting views of how humans react to language":
According to radical multiculturalists, language is used most
powerfully for subconscious or rhetorical effect; scholars in
their writing and government in its legislation should recognize and respond to this primarily noncognitive aspect of
language. For defenders of the Enlightenment, on the other
hand, language is (or should be) primarily a tool for rational
argument .

. .

. [S]cholars who seek to persuade others

should rely on rational argument, and the governmentwhich draws its legitimacy from the consent of the
governed-should not limit the very tool that allows the
populace to reach considered judgments (p 48).
Notwithstanding the gulf created by the divergence in premisesa gulf the authors see as wider even than the participants believe
(pp 49-50)' 2 -Farber and Sherry argue that we should "not abandon the idea of productive debate between opposing viewpoints"
(p 50). At the end of the second chapter, they propose the terms
on which that debate might profitably continue. They decline to
debate the "truth" of the multiculturalists ideas, because "the two
sides espouse different theories of truth and commitments to different forms of persuasion" (p 50). Instead, Farber and Sherry
10 Catharine MacKinnon has made this argument about pornography. See Catharine
MacKinnon, Only Words (Harvard 1993). Some critical race theorists, however, propose an
analysis bearing some similarity to MacKinnoes in the area of hate speech. See, for example, Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 Mich L Rev 2320 (1989) (advocating public sanction for hate speech offenses).
11426 US 229, 239-42 (1976) (holding that evidence of racially disproportionate impact
is insufficient to prove the discriminatory purpose necessary to show an equal protection
violation). Lawrence makes this argument in The Id, The Ego and EqualProtection:Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, 39 Stan L Rev 317 (1987).
"According to Farber and Sherry, "attempts at dialogue may often misfire because
the disputants share less common ground than they may believe' (pp 49-50).
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propose to debate whether multiculturalism produces a viable
political vision, a kind of consequentialism they describe as
"fight[ing] on the radicals own terms" (p 50). They describe the
criteria for assessing a viable political vision, noting that they
believe these criteria to be shared by both sides, in spite of their
many differences:
* A valid conception of equality should condemn racism not
only against Blacks and Hispanics but also against Asians
and Jews.
* Advocates of equality need to be able to engage in constructive discussions with each other and to contribute to
public discourse in society at large.
*

. . . [S]ociety should aim for the fullest possible understanding of the past ... and should reject any standard for

truth that allows suppression of the memory of genuine
suffering (p 50).
These apparently uncontroversial criteria are not, however, selected at random. In the succeeding chapters, Farber and Sherry
purport to demonstrate that multiculturalism fails each one of
them. They argue first that the critique of merit is anti-Semitic
(and anti-Asian) because, having abandoned the concept of merit
as irredeemably political, multiculturalists can offer no explanation for Jewish (or Asian) financial or academic success that does
not draw upon familiar, invidious stereotypes. They argue next
that the use of narrative has been responsible for the degradation
of legal discourse. Not only has a divisive quest for "authenticity"
replaced Enlightenment scholars' concern with the "typicality" of
anecdotal examples, but the normative component of narrative
scholarship has also been stymied by stories whose normative
import is nonexistent or unclear. Consequently, collegial relations
among scholars have disintegrated into feuding over the truth
and interpretation of particular stories. Finally, Farber and
Sherry argue that multicultural scholars' lack of concern about
the truth of their narratives contributes to an intellectual environment in which no account of the past can persuasively be
gainsaid. The result is an environment that provides fertile
ground for theories like Holocaust revisionism. Because of these
problems, the authors argue that multiculturalism should be
abandoned. They take care to note, however, that they are not
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rejecting all versions of feminist, critical, or race theory, merely
all those that share the three critical premises. 3

II. DEFEATING MULTICULTURALISM
For all its invocation of rational exchange, Beyond All Reason
does not, in fact, encourage dialogue. It is difficult to find a point
of entry into the authors' discussion or to imagine a response that
would elicit their attention, let alone their respect. The book's argument is constructed not so much to assess or even engage as to
defeat. It does so by employing a distinctive methodology that
carefully defines both the targets of its attack and the idiosyncratic terms on which they will be evaluated. In this Section, I lay
out that method and explain why it fails to persuade, and why it
violates Farber and Sherry's own criteria for rational argument.
Then, I reflect on some of the reasons that their challenge may
have taken this particular form, a vehement effort to discredit
multiculturalism that, oddly, embraces some of the very methods
it criticizes. I argue that Farber and Sherry's performance is a
product of the very transformation in methodological and epistemological assumptions that their multicultural opponents have
achieved. By challenging, in the name of group-based equality, a
range of scholarly premises about how we know, how we value,
and how we persuade, multiculturalists have created an environment in which traditional scholars feel sufficiently embattled
to engage in stronger and more focused claims about the magnitude of the threat to dominant norms. At the same time, however,
multiculturalists have introduced into academia a broader methodological vocabulary into which mainstream scholars have begun to dip almost unawares. In the final Section of this Review, I
focus on the question of challenges to narrative to discuss how
traditional scholars and multiculturalists might engage each
other in the new landscape created by these changes.
A.

A Discourse on Method

Farber and Sherry's argument has several discrete phases.
The first is to introduce the three central multiculturalist crinot clear precisely how many of these premises a feminist or race-based account
must share in order for it to be classified as "radical multiculturalism." When the authors
discuss the way these premises intersect and function together, they mention that not all
multiculturalists subscribe to all of them. Among their targets, Farber and Sherry include
Professors Duncan Kennedy and Catharine MacKinnon, whom they describe as subscribing to two of the three, and Professors Richard Delgado, Gary Peller, and Patricia Williams, whom they suggest subscribe to all three (p 121).
13 It is
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tiques. Farber and Sherry document their premises through a series of abbreviated quotations, reflecting the ostensible concurrence of a range of authors, 4 a method which is of considerable
significance to their effort. According to the authors, their method
of analysis reflects a conscious choice to use the multiculturalists'
own language where possible, and employ brief excerpts in the interests of accessibility (p 16). Once Farber and Sherry have presented multicultural scholarship, they proceed, in the second
phase of their inquiry, to assess it. Farber and Sherry propose to
assess multicultural scholarship in a purely consequentialist
manner-according to the world it is likely to create. There are,
however, many forms of consequential analysis, and Farber and
Sherry employ a rather idiosyncratic variant. In each chapter in
which the consequences of multiculturalism are assessed, the nature of the relationship between multicultural scholarship and
the claimed consequence varies widely. Some consequences are
actual occurrences that have arisen from the publication and discussion of multicultural scholarship. In the chapter on the degradation of legal discourse, for example, the authors describe painful struggles among scholars over "authenticity" in the depiction
of group-based experience and over the meaning of particular
narratives. Yet other "consequences," which receive equal emphasis in the authors' account, have a far more speculative or attenuated relationship to multiculturalism. In the most controversial chapter of the book, the authors describe multiculturalism as
fueling anti-Semitism because multiculturalists' rejection of
merit renders them unable to explain, without recourse to stereotype, the disproportionate financial and academic success of Jews
(and Asians). In a similarly speculative chapter, Farber and
Sherry describe multiculturalism as threatening the erasure of
human pain and suffering. Multiculturalists' "casual" attitude
toward truth, in the eyes of the authors, makes it impossible for
them to challenge distortive accounts of the past, such as Holocaust revisionism.
"

In the first chapter, for example, they state:

[Knowledge, reason and merit... involve standards ofjudgment, which according to

the radicals are socially constructed and culturally contingent, and thus suspect. As
critical race theorist Alex Johnson writes, "the presumed norm of neutrality actually
masks the reality that the Euro-American male's perspective is the background norm
or heuristic governing in the normal evaluative context." Stanley Fish, a Milton
scholar who holds a joint appointment in the law school and English Department at
Duke, similarly contends that "like 'fairness,' 'merit,' and 'free speech,' Reason is a

political entity," an "ideologically charged" product of "a decidedly political agenda."
Justice, too, is substantively contentless; one critic of the radicals suggests that they
view "talk of 'injustice' as a "rhetorically disguised demand for capitulation" (p 25).
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Three things should be said about this method. First, it is
unconvincing and potentially damaging as a critique of multiculturalism. Second, it is inconsistent with Farber and Sherry's own
Enlightenment-based premises. Third, notwithstanding these difficulties, it may be useful to ask what a critique with these attributes tells us about the progress of the culture wars, in law
and elsewhere.
B. Method and Message
1.

Presenting multicultural works and their consequences.

The first element of Farber and Sherry's method, the use of
multiple, abbreviated quotations, does not always do justice to
their goals. Moreover, their method imposes certain burdens on
the reader that Farber and Sherry fail to mention. The brevity of
the quotations (individual authors rarely get more than a phrase
at a time) means that readers are deprived of the opportunity to
witness the unfolding of an argument, or to observe the context
that would highlight the argument's applications or qualifications
more clearly. These problems are exacerbated by the fact that
many of the direct quotations include hotly contested terms such
as "political" or "socially constructed," which may have different
meanings in the work of different authors. "Social construction"
means something different to Catharine MacKinnon, a structuralist with a strong normative agenda, than to Stanley Fish, a
poststructuralist who disclaims any normative agenda. The
statement "the concept of merit is political" seeks to incite a different response when it is uttered by Stanley Fish (readers
should recognize the rhetoricity of all standards and use this insight to their advantage) than when it is uttered by Richard Delgado or Derrick Bell (readers should replace the current standards, which are illegitimately grounded in the norms of the racially privileged, with more equitable or inclusive standards).
When readers see these statements juxtaposed, without a nuanced development of the larger arguments, they may assume
that authors are in fact saying the same things, an assumption
that is encouraged, rather than challenged, by Farber and
Sherry's
broad-brush approach to a range of highly differentiated
15
works.

" In this Section, I argue, by reference to a series of examples, that Farber and Sherry
mischaracterize, often by simplifying or homogenizing, the scholars they critique. Because
I am unable, in a Review of this length, to address all of the scholars they critique, and because I believe a more in-depth examination is an appropriate answer to their broad survey approach, I focus on the work of four or five of their targets. A reasonable response to
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A good example of these problems comes from Farber and
Sherry's discussion of the critique of merit. Farber and Sherry
cite a number of multiculturalist authors for the propositions that
"merit standards are created by the powerful to perpetuate their
own power," and such standards accordingly reflect and reward
the characteristics possessed by privileged white men (pp 31-33).
One voice sampled is that of Stanley Fish, whose statement
"there is no such thing as intrinsic merit" passes into this chorus
virtually unremarked (p 31). Yet Fish's critique of merit is different from that of many with whom he shares the page. Fish regards the current system of academic "merit" as embodying the
racial and other biases of those who hold power within it. This is
not a pathology of this particular system, however. According to
Fish, any regime of merit is inevitably partial, reflecting the influence of those whose norms, characteristics, and preferences
give decisive shape to their particular community. This partiality,
moreover, cannot be transcended through an effort to reconstitute
merit. "Any effort to redress the effects of discrimination," Fish
argues, "will only reinstitute discrimination as its unsought-for
but inevitable by-produc: 6
The demand that discrimination be eliminated entirely is finally the demand that we live outside (or above or to the side
of) the varied and conflicting perspectives that give to each of
us a world saturated with goods, goals, aspirations and obligations. It is the demand that we no longer be human beings-beings defined by partiality-but become as gods, beings who know no particular time or place. This is the dream
not only of philosophy but of theology..., but until we are
the beneficiaries of a revelation or of a god who descends to
begin his reign on earth, it must remain just that, a dream,
and we will continue to be confined within the traditions and
histories that generate our differing senses of what is true
and good and worth dying for.... No one's story is the whole
story, and in the various lights shed by our various stories,
this choice is to ask, aren't there still multicultural scholars as to whom their characterizations are more appropriate? It is possible that there are. However, I have not selected
my examples at random. I have chosen to explore at greater length the work of scholars
who espouse a fairly extreme version of one of the critiques (for example, Stanley Fish and
Richard Delgado on the critique of merit), or who have been a frequent target of Enlightenment scholars' claims (for example, Patricia Williams). My point is to suggest that if
these scholars are not espousing the views that Farber and Sherry ascribe to them, there
are probably not many who are. Farber and Sherry's presentation of their opponents'
scholarly works suggests a lack of precision or care that should worry readers, and other
proponents of full academic exchange.
" Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech at 74 (cited in note 2).
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different truths will seem self-evident and different courses
of action will seem obviously called for.1"
As the concluding phrase suggests, Fish does not propose that we
simply throw up our hands over the problem of merit, or employ
an arbitrary device, such as a lottery.'8 He proposes instead that
we continue to argue the merits of different approaches to merit,
understanding that no system will be a predictable victor, commended by some universal meta-criterion of selection. Instead,
the outcome of these contests will be variably, contingently, and
locally determined. As he states:
And where does [the inevitably partiality of systems of
merit] leave us? Just where we have always been, debating
various agendas, each of which pursues goals that exclude or
de-emphasize the goals of its rivals and none of which can
legitimately claim to be more fair or more objective or more
neutral than any other. Now, realizing that no agenda can
make good on that claim... shifts our attention away from
the realm of abstract moral calculation and into the realm of
particularized history, where questions are asked in a context and not in a vacuum. 9
When Farber and Sherry surround Fish with a group of
scholars who argue that we can, at least in theory, transcend discrimination, and when they cut his subtle and distinctive theory
to an uninflected phrase, few readers will discern the position
Fish actually took.
These problems, which range from failures of nuance to
larger mischaracterizations, are relevant not simply to the descriptions of multiculturalism that Farber and Sherry provide.
Elements of these characterizations form the major premises for
Farber and Sherry's arguments about the dangerous and even
anti-Semitic consequences of multiculturalism. When the actual
content of the critics' arguments turns out to be different than
Farber and Sherry suggest, the relationship to the claimed consequences is further attenuated or severed as well.
As we saw above, Stanley Fish does not reject all notions of
merit, he simply views it as a localized concept that cannot avoid
partiality. Moreover, he does not abandon all hope of making
qualitative comparisons among works or candidates; he simply
17Id.

8 These are solutions that Farber and Sherry ascribe to multiculturalists who have offered critiques of merit (p 32).
19 Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech at 75 (cited in note 2).
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argues that the bases for such comparison cannot be grounded in
any meta-principle that is equally persuasive to all communities
or groups. The mischaracterization of Fish is not unique, however. Richard Delgado, a multiculturalist with views entirely distinct from those of Fish, does not embrace the view that Farber
and Sherry ascribe to him either. Delgado's critique is, as the
authors suggest, distinctively focused on the dominant academic
measures of merit. He is concerned not with the partiality of
merit writ large, but with the partiality of merit as it tends to be
understood in the American legal academy. Yet both his specific
critiques of academic merit and his normative prescriptions are
different than those attributed to him. His argument about the
distortions of the "meritocracy" is not a reflexive rant about the
self-perpetuation of the powerful. It is a careful discussion of the
ways in which "meritocratic" criteria-from the SAT and LSAT to
the valuation of conversational skills-tend to reward those who
already enjoy privilege in certain ways." Delgado's argument is
not only more precise than Farber and Sherry suggest, it is also
more difficult to distinguish from the kind of argument Farber
and Sherry claim to endorse-namely, that current standards
may rely on flawed indicators (p 53).21 In addition, Delgado, like

Fish, does not become cynical or nihilistic when confronting the
task of reformulating or improving standards. His most recent article on the subject, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action,22 ends with a proposal for a conference at which
those disadvantaged by race and class would form an alliance to
bring their distinctive characteristics and life experiences to the
"reconstruction of merit." This suggestion is not, of course, a complete proposal, but it diverges from Farber and Sherry's claim
that multiculturalists "condemn the current standards of evaluation but offer no substitute" (p 32), and from their claim that Delgado himself proposes "a standard that guarantees racial and
gender proportionality" (p 32).23 If Fish and Delgado do not con-

See, for example, Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle:Merit and Affirmation Action, 83 Georgetown L J 1711, 1719, 1741 (1995). Interestingly, in part of this argument, Delgado cites a similar argument by Stanley Fish. Id at 1741 n 98, citing Fish,
There'sNo Such Thing as Free Speech at 63 (cited in note 2).
" A distinction in degree between these two kinds of arguments might, however, become a distinction in kind, because Delgado finds fault not just with one or two indicators

used by the current "meritocracy" but with a large range (for example, the SAT, LSAT,
and IQ tests). Delgado, 83 Georgetown L J at 1741-45.

Id at 1746-48.
Although Farber and Sherry cite a 1984 publication for this proposition, Delgado's
recent work addressing the question of merit and affirmation action shows no trace of it.
See id at 1741-45.

1104

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[65:1091

tend, as Farber and Sherry suggest, that no performance can legitimately be regarded as better than any other and that the best
answer is to disclaim measures of merit entirely, then there are a
range of explanations available to them to explain Jewish or
Asian success without reference to stereotypes.'
To take another example, the connection of multiculturalism
to phenomena like Holocaust revisionism ostensibly arises because multiculturalists display a casual attitude toward truth in
narratives. Here, too, the major premise is supported better by
Farber and Sherry's excerpts than it is by the actual works of the
authors cited. The most striking example is Patricia Williams's
frequently discussed commentary on Tawana Brawley" In a passage quoted by Farber and Sherry that concludes a description of
the condition in which Brawley was found and the conflicting allegations that followed from it, Williams states:
This much is certainly worth the conviction that Tawana
Brawley has been the victim of some unspeakable crime. No
matter how she got there. No matter who did it to her-and
even if she did it to herself. Her condition was clearly the expression of some crime against her, some tremendous violence, some great violation that challenges comprehension.
And it is this much that I grieve about (p 46).26

"In other words," Farber and Sherry state, "whether it was true
or false, Tawana Brawley's story tells us something about the
condition of black women" (p 96). So far, so good, but they continue:
Is Williams right? Does it matter whether Tawana Brawley
was telling the truth about the white men or whether "she
did it to herself"? In this chapter, we contend that it matters
very much. And it matters most of all to those who are truly
victimized. Leave aside the unfairness to the men Brawley
accused. The radical multiculturalists seem unable or unFarber and Sherry even offer a few of these, prior to arguing that they are unavailable to multiculturalists because multiculturalists reject all notions of merit (pp 60-61). Of
those they mention the notion that Jews and Asians have embraced dominant notions of
merit as an adaptive, rather than oppressive, move, and the notion that Jewish and Asian
communities have, independently, developed norms with considerable congruence to
dominant American society strike me as most plausible.
' Tawana Brawley was an African-American teenager who was reported missing for
several days. When she was found, with her clothing torn, smeared with excrement and
marked with a racial epithet, she stated that she had been abducted and abused by a
group of white men.
Williams, Alchemy at 169-70 (cited in note 8). Farber and Sherry discuss this quote
at p 96.
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willing to differentiate between Brawley's fantasized rape
and another woman's real one. Indifference to the distinction
between fact and fiction minimizes real suffering by implying that it is no worse than imagined or self-inflicted suffering (p 96).
There are many things that are disturbing about this paragraph.
To begin with, the authors imply that if Brawley was not telling
the truth about the abduction and attack, she could not in any
sense be understood as a victim, but only as a possibly deluded
perpetrator (demonstrated by phrases such as "Brawley's fantasized rape" and her "imagined or self-inflicted suffering"). But
even more disturbing for my present purposes is that the passage
misses Williams's point. If Williams is, in fact, suggesting that we
may learn something crucial from Brawley's story, whether it was
true or not, she is not suggesting that we learn the same thing
from Brawley's story whether it is true or not. This passage
seems to me to suggest 7 that if the story is not true, we learn
something not about the damage that particular perpetrators did
to Tawana Brawley, but about the damage that this society does
to those who are Black and female and poor; damage that might
make Tawana Brawley want to tell this story or even inflict this
harm upon herself. Moreover, Williams is not suggesting that this
case, whatever it may have to teach us, should have the same legal consequences whether Brawley's story is true or not.' Brawley's story may offer valuable social insights even if it is not true,
and it is to these insights, which have been largely ignored in the
strife over the story's truth and legal sufficiency, that Williams
directs her attention in the quoted passage. Farber and Sherry's
insistence that Williams must be talking about the story's legal
consequences-and that she believes that these consequences
should be the same whether the story is true or not-is a distortion of Williams's discussion.

' I am reluctant to identify a determinate meaning in a quote that is more elliptical,
and perhaps more ambiguous, than most in Williams's work. This elliptic manner appears
partly intentional because one of the points of the longer passage is that Brawley's case
has become a maelstrom of conflicting appropriations, with a growing silence at the center
where Tawana Brawley's own story should be.
Farber and Sherry implicitly ascribe this view to Williams when they quote Anne
Coughlin as saying- "In what kind of a legal system would it make no difference whether a
woman who claimed that she had been raped was telling the truth." (p 96). Williams, in as
much as she refers to the legal proceedings in the case, focuses on the fact that the outcome was a foregone conclusion once the mainstream media and (white) political leaders
began offering their constructions of the case and on the fact that Tawana Brawley's personal story has probably not been heard. Williams, Alchemy at 169-70 (cited in note 8).
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One might also consider Farber and Sherry's discussion of
my own work on a similar point.' Farber and Sherry quote me as
saying that I "would not be particularly disturbed" if a narrative
purporting to be nonfiction turned out not to "track the life experiences of [its] narrator in all particulars" or to be a composite (p
98). The actual quote was part of a context-based discussion of
the circumstances under which I would and would not find this
discovery to be disturbing. This discussion seeks to answer the
question: "If the reader suspects that the author did not have
(precisely) the experience she reports, how should that affect the
credibility of the narrative... [and] the way the reader views the
larger account of which the narrative is a part °
In my view, the effect of the reader's doubts on the credibility
of a narrative should depend upon the kind of narrative being offered. In the "first-person agony narrative," it seems
particularly important that the pain described was experienced, in some similar form, by the author. In this type of
narrative, it is not just the authority ostensibly conferred by
experience, but the hardships endured or risks taken in exposing a controversial experience that enlist the reader's
support. If the reader suspected that the author only pretended to endure this hardship or take this risk, it might
generate in the reader a feeling of betrayal, as well as casting a shadow over any prescriptive arguments that arose
from the author's account ....
In narratives that relate [the "expert" insights of an "insider," rather than drawing on the suffering of the narrator],
the need for a perceived correspondence between the
author's narrative and the author's life is somewhat less
clear. On the one hand, if readers are to take the narrator as
an "expert," we obviously want to know that her account
bears some relationship to something she has experienced....
But, on the other hand, as I explained above, I believe [such
narratives] not only because they come from self-described
victims... , but because their particularity, internal consis-

I will hereafter refrain from attempts to "set the record straight" in relation to my

own work. But as Farber and Sherry characterize my approach to the truth of stories as
preparing the ground for practices such as Holocaust revisionism, this example is too

much to let pass.
Kathryn Abrams, Hearingthe Call of Stories, 79 Cal L Rev 971, 1025 (1991).
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tency and
tone render them coherent, illuminating and com31
pelling.

It is at this point that I make the statement quoted by Farber
and Sherry: "Were I to learn that these stories did not track the life
experiences of their narratorsin all particularsor that they were
32 However,
composites, I would not be particularly disturbed."
immediately following this statement, I continue:
An "insider" narrative that turned out to be a complete fabrication, however, would be a greater problem. Feminist scholars such as Angela Harris have argued for the embrace of an
"ethics of representation" that would require narrative
scholars to make clear who is speaking in their stories, and
on what basis the speaker claims authority. Surely a fabricated "insider" story would violate this ethic, and cast doubt
on a range of legitimate renditions of women's experience.
But beyond this case, the waters become murkier. Creating
any narrative involves a process of mediation, of muting and
amplification, of selection among details. What sorts of modifications "insider" narrators should be required to disclose to
their readers is a difficult question about which feminist
scholars continue to differ.33
Thus, examination of the fuller positions articulated by the
authors, including myself, whom Farber and Sherry cite does not
support the contention that multiculturalists are indifferent to
the truth of experiential narratives. Patricia Williams argues
that even untrue statements may turn out to have social value, a
"radical" view tracing its lineage to John Stuart Mill.' I argue
that narrative is always a mediated rendition of experience, and
that the precise relationship required for credibility between the
author's account and the author's life should vary depending on
the nature of the narrative and the purposes for which it is offered. Furthermore, I endorse an "ethics of representation," as
proposed by Angela Harris, that requires the disclosure of that
relationship in cases of salient departure. Thus, neither of the
Id.
Id (emphasis added).
= Id at 1025-26 (particular illustrations have been excised).
Perhaps because Patricia Williams and John Stuart Mill espouse different epistemological premises, they would extract the social value from statements that are not true
by different processes. Mill advocates that these statements be placed in contest with
"true" statements, which would prevail through a kind of adversary process. See John
Stuart Mill, On Liberty 15-37 (Crofts Classics 1947). Williams would seem to advocate
that such views be studied for the excluded and/or misappropriated perspectives they provide.
31
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authors challenged display the casual attitudes toward truth that
Farber and Sherry see as foreclosing attacks on theories such as
Holocaust revisionism. In short, the claims linking multiculturalsm with anti-Semitic norms or consequences, which were attenuated at best, are further undermined by the failure of Farber
and Sherry's major premises.
2.

Pervasive claims of anti-Semitism.

These explicit arguments, however, are not the only ways in
which Farber and Sherry seek to connect multiculturalism with
anti-Semitism. They also seek to bring home the ostensibly antiSemitic implications of multiculturalism by less direct means. In
this respect, their arguments assessing the consequences of multiculturalism descend from the unpersuasive to the deeply disturbing.
The authors wage a campaign of guilt-by-association against
Derrick Bell, the originator of the critical race narrative and one
of the founders of critical race theory. Bell is criticized for
authoring a fictional chronicle in which Jewish protagonists demonstrate mixed motives in seeking to prevent Blacks from being
removed by a group of aliens.35 He is charged with displaying solicitude toward that veritable lightning rod for Black-Jewish tensions, Louis Farrakhan (p 44). With the exception of a brief section in the introduction (p 4), however, Farber and Sherry do not
actually mount an argument that Bell holds views that are antiSemitic. Nor do they argue that Bell-and by inference other
multiculturalists-should be regarded as holding views that are
anti-Semitic because Bell has written a particular chronicle or
displayed solicitude toward Farrakhan. (I would add that I would
find either argument unpersuasive, given Bell's actual writings.")
', Derrick Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Persistence of Racism 158
(HarperCollins 1992).
' As for Bell's alleged solicitude toward Farrakhan, I am unwilling to perpetuate what
I regard as a flawed policy among some Jews of calling on virtually every AfricanAmerican leader of prominence to disclaim Farrakhan in the face of his anti-Semitic remarks. Farrakhan and some other Nation of Islam leaders, such as Khalid Abdul
Muhammed, have made anti-Semitic statements that I reject, and that I believe others, of
any racial group, who care about group-based equality should reject. These attitudes, in
my mind, make Farrakhan a less fit leader than others who reject anti-Semitism in all its
manifestations, and a problematic public representative of the Black community. But I do
not believe such attitudes require that Blacks deny the benefits Farrakhan has provided
to that community. Black leaders are required to disclaim Farrakhan's anti-Semitism, but
no similar requirement is imposed on other groups, many of whom have comparable figures in their own midst. Christians are never called upon to disclaim the anti-Semitism of
Pat Buchanan; nor are Jews, for that matter, required to disclaim the racism of Meir Kahane. In this context, the demand that Black leaders disclaim Farrakhan suggests, at the
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very least, that some Jews are more willing to look for anti-Semitism at the margins of society than within power structures where it can do far more to harm them.
Moreover, Derrick Bell's discussion of Farrakhan (which occurs, ironically, in the context of a discussion of the pressure on Black leaders to disclaim those who make statements deemed "outrageous" by those in power) is complicated. Bell's description of Farrakhan as offering a form of forthright resistance to the white power structure and a form of
empowerment to young Blacks that few other leaders have been able to match is in some
respects similar that of Cornel West, who is often viewed as a champion of Black-Jewish
relations. Compare Bell, Faces at 118-25 (cited in note 35), with Cornel West, BlackJewish Dialogue:Beyond Rootless Universalism and Ethnic Chauvinism, 4:3 Tikkun 95,
96 (1989) ("The state of siege now raging in Black America, the sense of frustration and
hopelessness, pushes people to look toward a leader who speaks in bold and defiant terms.
The Black elected officials tend not to speak to these deep needs. Farrakhan tries to fill
the vacuum ... ."). And while Bell's discussion contains passages that praise Farrakhan
frankly ("Minister Farrakhan, calm, cool, and very much on top of the questions, handles
these self-appointed guardians with ease. I love it!"), Bell, Faces at 118 (cited in note 35),
he constructs a dialogue that permits the problem of anti-Semitic statements and Black
responses to them to be discussed at length, from a number of perspectives, some of which
attempt to illustrate how the Jewish anguish over Farrakhan looks to at least some
Blacks. This seems to me instructive, particularly if one is willing to acknowledge that
this ferment may look different from the perspective of Blacks than from the perspectives
of Jews. However, it is not a matter of saying (as Farber and Sherry's worry about relativism might suggest) that Blacks will inevitably view the controversy one way and Jews
another. Some of Bell's conclusions seem plausible, even to me, approaching the controversy as (one kind of) Jew. In one section, for example, Bell states:
Were I a Jew, I would be damned concerned about the latent-and often active-antiSemitism in this country. But to leap with a vengeance on inflammatory comments
by blacks is a misguided effort to vent justified fears on black targets of opportunity
who are the society's least powerful influences and-I might add-the most likely to
be made the scapegoats for deeply rooted anti-Semitism that they didn't create and
that will not be cured by their destruction.
Id at 121. While some of Bell's discussion may be jarring to some Jewish sensibilities (including my own), to suggest that this discussion is anti-Semitic seems incorrect and inflammatory.
I reach similar conclusions about Bell's chronicle of "he Space Traders." It is true, as
Farber and Sherry state, that Bell describes a plot of resistance (to the removal of all
Blacks by the Space Traders) by Jews calling themselves the "Anne Frank Committee."
Though the Committee publicly describes its motives as reflecting "the fateful parallel between the plight of blacks in this country and the situation of the Jews in Nazi Germany,"
Bell notes that "[a] concern of many Jews not contained in their official condemnations of
the Trade offer, was that, in the absence of blacks, Jews could become the scapegoats for a
system ... reliant on an identifiable group on whose heads less-well-off whites can discharge their hate and frustrations for societal disabilities .... " Id at 186. This is not a
flattering picture of Jews (who may well have enjoyed, as I did, the first part of the passage, which depicted Jews as taking an atypically strong position against the proposed
removal of Black citizens), but it is also not the end of the matter. Jews are described as
victims, as well as allies with mixed motives, in the succeeding passage. Here Bell relates
a plan engineered by the Attorney General, to prevent a small group of Jews from "besmirch[ing] the good names of all patriotic ... Jews" by blacklisting members of the Anne
Frank Committee. Id at 187. Bell states:
Retaliation was quick. Within hours, men and women listed as belonging to the
committee lost their jobs; their contracts were canceled; their mortgages foreclosed,
and harassment of them, including physical violence, escalated into a nationwide resurgence of anti-Semitic feeling ....
The Jews who opposed the Trade were intimidated into silence and inaction. The leaders of [the group] were themselves forced
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Such associations are simply dropped into paragraphs that are
not facially concerned with anti-Semitism.
Nor are Bell's alleged affiliations the only indirect means the
authors use to suggest a connection between multiculturalism
and anti-Semitism. Although Farber and Sherry survey a range
of social and cultural damages that are alleged to flow from multicultural scholarship, one theme predominates: virtually every
harm that is predicted or hypothesized is illustrated by reference
to a development or controversy that has victimized Jews. Thus,
the tendency toward authoritarianism by those who employ narrative methodology is illustrated by the Dreyfus affair (pp 10203); the consequence of relativism in the characterization of
"truth" in narrative is illustrated by difficulty of challenging
Holocaust revisionism (pp 109-10); the tendency of narrative to
degrade scholarly discourse is illustrated by an academic battle
between two Jews over a Patricia Williams narrative dealing
with anti-Semitism (pp 90-94); even Chapter Four, which identifies as a specific drawback of multiculturalism the fostering of
arguments that the authors take to be anti-Semitic, ends with a
reference to another, implicit connection, a chilling story about
the failure to recognize merit in a concentration camp (p 71).
The cumulative effect of these connections is to suggest that
wherever multiculturalism shows its face, norms or controversies
evincing anti-Semitism are not far behind.
into hiding, leaving few able to provide any haven for blacks.
Id. Both the McCarthy-esque strategy, and its consequences, are grotesque, leaving little
doubt about the vulnerable status of the Jews. While they are not, of course, the wholly
devalued group who become the object of the Space Traders' exchange, Jews live on a precarious edge, which serves at least to contextualize their earlier, somewhat unappealing
concern about their own status. Moreover, Jews are not the only ones who display mixed
motives in opposing the Trade (business leaders make a hypocritical protest aimed at
saving a portion of their market and their work force), nor are they the only ones who engage in a struggle over the scarce territory at the societal margin (the quote about the motives of the Anne Frank Committee makes clear that other marginal groups engaged in
scapegoating). One can question why Jews, via this subplot, were held up for particular
criticism at all; and one can ask whether this treatment demonstrates the kind of inappropriate focus on those close to the social margins that Bell himself criticized in the case
of the Jewish attacks on Farrakhan. But, in the end, this may be a question that distinguishes (some) Jewish perspective(s) from those of an African-American author. This is a
chronicle about betrayal of Black Americans by the dominant power structure which systematically devalued them, by the legal system whose equality-based precedents were not
strong enough to help them, by a variety of groups whose motives were too mixed or whose
positions made them too vulnerable to be of much use. While the picture of Jews it presents is not pretty, Jews do not fare conspicuously less well than any other group in this
nightmarish account. It does not, to my mind, provide a basis for charging Bell with antiSemitism.
' This story ends, rather gratuitously, with the conclusion: "In hell, it seems, all reality is socially constructed, and merit does not exist" (p 71).
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Finally, Farber and Sherry make the claim, which operates
to ratify the preceeding implications, that multiculturalism
threatens Jews by challenging the protection conferred upon
them by Enlightenment values. The authors cite a series of historical figures, from French counter-revolutionaries to German
Romantics to Christian crusaders, who have both challenged Enlightenment premises and displayed variously virulent forms of
anti-Semitism. Farber and Sherry then suggest that this connection is not accidental, because Jews have both perpetuated and
received protection from Enlightenment values:
Jews have been especially committed to Enlightenment beliefs, and thus have been instrumental in secularizing and
universalizing American culture.... It is a reciprocal rela-

tionship; the Enlightenment focus on intellect and away
from pedigree, on achievement rather than biography, on
universal rather than local standards of merit, helped to
open doors that had previously been closed to Jews (p 71).
Although Farber and Sherry return in the succeeding passage to
the particular damage done by the critique of merit, their broader
suggestion is that challenges to Enlightenment values threaten to
undermine the protection that Jews have received from these
values.
I have immediate sympathy with Farber and Sherry's concern about the scourge of anti-Semitism. The atrocities they cite
occurred within many of our lifetimes, and snuffed out the lives of
millions as an expression of pure racial hatred. These atrocities
should be abhorred and remembered, and their repetition prevented. I also have no difficulty with Farber and Sherry's more
generalized concern for the well-being of the Jewish people. It is
inconsistent, as I will argue, with their emphasis on Enlightenment values, but it is a predictable outgrowth of a group-based
conception of self with which I, as both a multiculturalist and a
Jew, feel perfectly comfortable. (I received my own introduction to
identity politics watching my parents decipher the import of any
political development by asking, "But what does it mean for the
Jews?"). But the claim that Jews are threatened by the multiculturalists' targeting of Enlightenment norms exceeds this kind of
quotidian, group-based concern. Jews have no doubt supported
and been supported by the norms of the Enlightenment, though
Jews have also been prominent critics of Enlightenment values,
particularly as they have been reflected in liberalism and its legal
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manifestations.' However, to claim a relationship to the Enlightment of sufficient reciprocity or exclusivity that she who at. One of the additional problems with Farber and Sherry's characterization of American Jews is its essentialism. As with any group-based identity, there are multiple ways of
characterizing what it means to be a Jew in this society; each entails its own account of
recent Black-Jewish tensions. Farber and Sherry's image highlights two salient facts
about Jews: their academic and financial success in American society and their vulnerability to continuing anti-Semitism. The emphasis on Jewish success in Farber and
Sherry's imagery tends to confer upon Jews a pro-system posture or attitude-it envisions
Jews as arrayed, for example, against the critique of merit as challenging their system,
the system under which they have enjoyed success. This pro-system posture is interrupted
only by the subtle vigilance with which Jews regard the operation of that system, watching for the reemergence of anti-Semitism. But even here, Farber and Sherry's critique of
the multiculturalists seems to suggest, Jews are more likely to find that threat materializing from outside the system, or from those exiled to its margins, than from the political
or institutional mainstream.
There are, however, many other ways of characterizing Jewish identity in American
society, some may be drawn from the work of other Jews and all of which highlight the
partiality or incompleteness of Farber and Sherry's characterization. One, which places a
more ambivalent gloss on Farber and Sherry's image of Jews as successful, and successfully assimilated, outsiders, is Gary Peller's account of Jews as having accepted a "cultural
compromise": "in exchange for cultural abnegation in public, we would be permitted our
Jewish identity in our private lives." Gary Pelier, The Discourse of ConstitutionalDegradation, 81 Georgetown L J 313, 340 (1992). As part of this compromise, Jews assert the
neutrality of the public sphere, though "we know as an existential matter that schools,
workplaces and other public settings are not really culturally neutral, but more particularly Protestant, middle class, and white. Our cultural compromise requires that we suppress that perception of public space." Id. This compromise may explain, according to Peller, why some Jews have responded with anxiety to race-consciousness on the part of
Blacks or critical race scholars. These outsiders have not accepted (nor have they probably
been offered) a cultural compromise: their group-consciousness specifically invokes the
non-neutrality of the public-or legal-sphere, making Jews more aware of their own constraint. Those who may not recognize the compromise, or wish to preserve it, respond
critically to these attacks on the neutrality of the public sphere. Those who experience
strongly the non-neutrality of the public sphere and value the ability and resolve to proclaim it, may look critically at the terms of the compromise.
Also to be found in the work of Jewish scholars is a third image of Jews. This image
portrays Jews as more persistent outsiders, frequently allied with others in the cause of
social transformation, whose status has only recently been called into question by a sizeable and vocal group of (successful) Jews who have become invested in dominant political
arrangements. As Rabbi Chaim Seidler-Feller explains, longtime veterans of radical and
progressive struggle, and important participants in the civil rights coalition, Jews began
to be divided in recent years, as some became Reagan Republicans and others seemed to
take the lead in opposing affirmative action. Rabbi Chaim Seidler-Feller, Blacks and Jews:
Troubled Times on the College Campuses, 4:3 Tikkun 92, 94 (1989) (quoting Jonathon
Kaufman as saying, "the Rainbow Coalition is the only progressive movement in recent
American history that was created and sustained with no meaningful Jewish involvement'). This recent shift, exacerbated by the Israeli conflict with the Palestinians and
arms sales to South Africa, has led some Blacks to see Jews as antagonists. These Blacks
have criticized Jews for their complicity in a political system that marginalizes people of
color, or have manifested greater tolerance for the anti-Semitic pronouncements of some
spokesmen such as Louis Farrakhan. This, in turn, has led Jews to be concerned about
anti-Semitism among Blacks, and to call on prominent Black leaders to disclaim antiSemitic statements. A vicious cycle has been established. Id at 92-94.
My point is not to say which image Jews or others should subscribe to, although I my-
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tacks the Enlightenment, in effect, attacks me, seems solipsistic 9
and bizarre. Moreover, the relentless drumbeat of anti-Semitic
consequences-explicit, implicit, carefully argued, subliminal-.
reflects more than a generalized concern with the well-being of
Jews. It reflects a suggestion that multiculturalism threatens the
equality or well-being of Jews.
This latter claim is disturbing for several reasons. First, the
authors' claims of anti-Semitic consequences are among the most
attenuated in the book. The problem is not, as Richard Posner
argued in an earlier review, that the claim of anti-Semitism is
grounded on an effect-based interpretation of discrimination that
is more characteristic of the multiculturalists than of Enlightenment scholars." The problem is that the claim of anti-Semitism is
not founded on any concrete effects at all. Sometimes Farber and
Sherry argue that multiculturalists make logical or analytic
moves (for example, the rejection of Enlightenment norms) that
are analogous to moves that have been made in some antiSemitic arguments. More often, they argue that multiculturalism
contributes to the kind of intellectual environment in which certain unattractive kinds of arguments, including some antiSemitic arguments, become more plausible. Even these speculative claims are weakened, as I argue above, by the fact that their
central premises are flawed.
Second, beyond the ungrounded character of the allegations,
the manner in which they are made seems likely to inflame an already-volatile set of group relations. The last decade has been an
extremely precarious time in Black-Jewish relations, given the
erosion of the civil rights coalition over some Jews' rejection of affirmative action, the use of anti-Semitic discourse by Farrakhan
and some other members of the Nation of Islam, the debates over
Jesse Jackson's response to Farrakhan, the Crown Heights inciself find the second and third images above more compelling than the first. My point is to
make clear that in promulgating one image of Jews as the image-and commending one
posture for Jews in response to multiculturalism as the appropriate posture-Farber and
Sherry not only engage in a partially disguised form of identity politics, but they suffer
from a problem that has plagued some forms of identity politics, the problem of essentializing those groups that are the sources of one's identity.
' This solipsism seems to me to be reflected in other portions of the argument as well.
The requirement that those who challenge the concept of merit (or in the case of some
critics, particular conceptions of merit) be required to explain Jewish success in academic
and/or financial contexts seems a peculiarly arbitrary and self-referential demand. Why
those who propose to change a particular social arrangement should be required to explain-with or without recourse to stereotypes-the prominent position of any one group
within that arrangement is a question Farber and Sherry never answer.
' Richard Posner, The Skin Trade, New Republic 40, 42 (Oct 13, 1997) (reviewing
Farber and Sherry, Beyond All Reason).
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dent, and more.4 ' These tensions have affected Jewish relations
with other communities of color, in part because many members
of these communities experience an affinity with the Palestinians
in their struggles with the state of Israel. These tensions are real,
and they can be ameliorated, if at all, only through careful, nuanced dialogue about the claims of mistreatment and the bases of
disagreement. Broad, speculative arguments such as those made
by Farber and Sherry will undoubtedly focus more attention on
the debate over multiculturalism, and may perhaps help to consolidate opposition to it. But they will do so at the cost of exacerbating a painful set of divisions, and framing the culture wars as
one more site of antagonism between Jews and communities of
color. This kind of argument is one that those concerned about
the degradation of discourse would do well to reconsider.
3.

Beyond Enlightment rationalism?

As the previous analysis suggests, many arguments offered
by Farber and Sherry are also inconsistent with their own premises. In its aspiration, and in the most apparent details of its
form, Beyond All Reason is a prototype of Enlightenment argumentation. The authors carefully lay out the premises of the
challenged approach and then trace its consequences. They employ a consistently measured tone, portraying reasonableness,
tinged with resignation and even regret about the intergroup tensions that may be exacerbated by the expression of these truths.42
Yet several features of their method display marked contrast
with the Enlightenment values they espouse. First, the articula41 These

developments have been discussed in books such as Paul Berman, ed, Blacks
and Jews: Alliances and Arguments (Delacorte 1995); Murray Friedman, What Went
Wrong? The Creationand Collapse of the Black-JewishAlliance (Free Press 1995); Michael
Lerner and Cornel West, Jews and Blacks: Let the HealingBegin (Putnam 1995).
42 They note:

Our argument against radical multiculturalism is unavoidably harsh, because we
view its flaws as serious, profound and dangerous. We do not, however, bring this argument forward without misgivings. The people whose views we criticize are, after
all, earnestly seeking to remedy some of the worst injustices of our society. Given our
liberal Jewish backgrounds, we feel a particular sense of discomfort in attacking the
work of progressive minority scholars, or of seeming to reopen old wounds between
the Jewish and black communities. Moreover we have a strong distaste for the
growing incivility of academic disputes. And despite our insistence that we are targeting certain ideas, rather than attacking the individuals who happen to hold those
ideas, we can hardly expect the individuals themselves to feel unscathed by our accusations.
All this we regret. Several friends, over the past few years, have urged these arguments as reasons for avoiding the topic. In the end, however, we feel that the issues
are too serious for us to remain silent (pp 13-14).
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tion of the multiculturalist perspective through the scholarly
equivalent of "sound bites" deprives readers of the deliberate unfolding of ideas that is a hallmark of "rational" argument. Second,
the authors occasionally retreat into guilt by association. To
make a fully developed argument that a particular scholar embraces premises that are anti-Semitic is a different enterprise
than associating him with anti-Semitism by suggesting his similarities to, or ostensible support of, anti-Semitic figures. The former reflects rational argument; the latter does not.
More centrally, however, Farber and Sherry employ methodological tools that are more typical of the methods they critique
than of the norms of the Enlightenment. Their determination to
assess multiculturalism according to its consequences seems
more typical of the pragmatism they acknowledge in the concluding chapter (pp 142-43) than of Enlightenment norms; an
Enlightenment approach would more likely seek to assess the
merits (or "truth") of the contending position.' Of their many
claims against multiculturalism, I take most seriously the argument that multiculturalism has produced a degradation of legal
discourse. Interestingly, Farber and Sherry support this claim
largely with narrative accounts of discursive havoc wreaked by
multicultural scholarship. They describe a failed conference sponsored by the feminist journal, Signs, to illustrate the struggles
over the "authenticity" of group-based experiences that arise from
the use of narrative (pp 82-83). They argue that civil disagreement about experiential narratives is impossible by recounting
the painful, internecine battle between Mark Tushnet and Gary
Peller over a narrative of Patricia Williams (pp 90-94). In the
midst of this second account-a jarring tale of a profound rift between two former allies and colleagues-I found myself marveling, "They really know how to tell a story!" I then realized the
irony of this point. Farber and Sherry's narrative is not an aside.
In its ostensibly typical particulars and it its use of emotional
pain as a part of persuasion, the story is an important element of
their argument.
' I thank Jim Fleming for this insight. Farber and Sherry may, in fact, acknowledge
this departure when they argue that forsaking truth for consequences is "fighting on the
radicals' own terms" (p 50).
However, while Farber and Sherry do not debate the comparative merits of the Enlightemnent and the multicultural approaches to truth, they seem, in some sections of the
book, to have declared victory without even having waged the war. As I argue in Section
HI,there are several places where the authors' critique of narrative scholarship seems to
stem from the assumption that we live in a scholarly world characterized solely by Enlightenment norms, rather than by plural norms that flow from methodological contention. I thank Nancy Cook for pointing this out to me.
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Similarly, the authors' concern with the impact of multiculturalism on Jews seems inconsistent with the Enlightenment
premise of epistemological individualism."4 Although they describe this concern emanating, first, from a rejection of all racebased antagonisms (p 50), and second, from a historical confluence of Enlightenment and Jewish interests (pp 69-71), their ongoing, particularized concern with the well-being of Jews seems
more plausibly explained as a manifestation of groupconsciousness-a sense that the self is constituted, at least in
part, through affiliations with others that shape the ways that
one understands the world.
Neither group-consciousness nor narrative epistemology
strikes me as particularly problematic.45 But these tactics should
be problematic for defenders of the Enlightenment, such as Farber and Sherry. Why the authors might have embraced these
elements and lapsed, in the ways that I have indicated, from Enlightenment rationalism, is an interesting question to which I
shall now turn.
C.

Endstage Culture Wars

Farber and Sherry find themselves at an important juncture
in the culture wars, particularly those struggles that have taken
place in the legal academy. Not only have feminism and critical
race theory been flourishing for more than a decade, but the
methodological innovations they have employed have begun to
creep, often imperceptibly, from the margin toward the center.
The authorial r has become commonplace, as perspectivity has
taken its place alongside universality and objectivist epistemologies. Experiential narrative has become so widespread, as a vehicle for scholarly persuasion, that it has ceased to be the exclusive
province of critical scholars and has increasingly been employed
by those within the mainstream. Professors cite the life experiences that have helped to produce theoretical reconceptualiza-

"I would describe epistemological individualism as the notion that people discern
things about the world as individuals rather than as members of groups. See generally,
Susan Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 Berkeley Women's L J 63, 64-66 (1993),
discussing Cartesian epistemology and drawing on the account of Allison Jagger and Susan Bordo, Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing
(Rutgers 1989).
However, a greater concern with the typicality of one's narrative is required when
one argues, as Farber and Sherry do, for the abandonment of a particular form of scholarship. See Abrams, 79 Cal L Rev at 1029-30 (cited in note 33) (arguing that the importance
of demonstrating some typicality in stories depends on the normative purposes for which
they are being offered).
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tions;46 conservative students explain how they have been silenced by progressive classmates and faculty professors; 7 critics

of feminism and critical race theory use narrative to illuminate
their bases for rejecting these movements. Some portion of this
wider use may be strategic: experiential narratives have been revealed to be an effective, or at least attention-getting,49 mode of
persuasion, and scholars of many stripes want to avail themselves of these benefits. But the repeated uses of such scholarly
innovations-and the arguments for their merits that have accompanied them-have also had a subtle, normalizing effect. The
idea that the "truth" of a given situation may depend on one's
group-based perspective, and the idea that one may validly persuade by rendering an experience in all its particulars and emotional immediacy, enjoy more support, more toleration, and more
widespread familiarity in the legal academy than they did a decade ago. When they are not allied with critical messages, these
methodological innovations are sometimes not even regarded as
radical.0 These developments make it possible for Farber and
Sherry to illustrate the negative consequences of narrative
through stories, or depict their concerns for Jews as a group,
while mounting a defense of epistemological individualism.

See, for example, Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption and the Politics of
Parentingxiii-xv (Houghton Mifflin 1992).
" In The MorningAfter: Sex, Fearand Feminism on Campus (Little, Brown 1993), Katie Roiphe alleges that she was stigmatized and criticized by feminist students at Princeton after her views on date rape and "Take Back the Night" marches became known,
making it more difficult for her to speak out. See Roiphe, The Morning After at 127-28. On
my own campus, when faculty have proposed student orientation sessions highlightig issues of race and gender, conservative students have argued that they have been silenced
or subjected to "mind control."
' An interesting work within this genre is Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 Iowa L Rev 145
(1994). Chen uses narrative to evoke what he sees as the constraints that the tenets of
critical race theory have imposed on people of color in their professional and private life
choices. Chen appears to believe that the particularity and emotional resonance that
characterize narrative make it an effective means of persuasion; he also seeks to use narrative because he believes it has been treated as an exclusive property by critical scholars.
"Anyone who challenges this ownership," he argues, "is treated as a trespasser." Jim
Chen, Panel on Narrative, National Association of Scholars (Jan 8, 1998).
' Martha Minow makes a similar argument about claims of victimization (which are
reflected in many experiential narratives, critical and otherwise), arguing that they make
an effective claim for attention in an "attention-taxed world." See Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L Rev 1411, 1414 (1993).
' See, for example, Bartholet, Family Bonds at 1-23. To take an example that is political rather than scholarly, former President Ronald Reagan used stories to illustrate the
need for particular kinds of policy commitments. While some critics complained about his
"anecdotage" (an argument I take to reflect a concern about the typicality of his examples),
few, if any, argued that he was undertaking a methodological innovation or threatening
the intellectual underpinnings of the Enlightenment.
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Paradoxically, however, this very process of normalization
may call for a stronger-or at least different-response by defenders of Enlightenment values. "The end of civilization as we
know it can seem a rather diffuse kind of threat, particularly
when the minions of multiculturalism have done their worst, and
civilization, as we know it, does not appear to have ended. It may
make sense to highlight a more focused set of dangers, which will
illustrate the costs more concretely or bring an identifiable set of
allies to the barricades. One cannot know whether Farber and
Sherry actually felt such a pull, but it is no surprise that a new,
and fiercer, theory of the harm has emerged at this particular
moment.
It seems to me, however, that precisely the opposite response
is called for. An eleventh-hour effort to secure a decisive victory
makes no provision for an increasingly likely scenario: that the
competing forces will be obliged to live alongside each other in the
more plural world that will emerge from a deadlock or truce. The
question that should now be asked is how mainstream scholars
might approach multiculturalism when the goal is not to banish
it, 5 but to reflect on its promise and drawbacks, and to participate, where possible, in refining and improving the genre. In the
following Section, I will pose a form of that question by revisiting
the most plausible claim made by Farber and Sherry-that narrative scholarship has resulted in the degradation of scholarly
discourse.
II.

HOW TO TALK TO A MULTICULTURALIST

At the end of their discussion of the critique of merit, Farber
and Sherry stop to marvel at the parade of horribles multiculturalism has ostensibly produced:
Does .anyone actually believe that graduate training is irrelevant to being a scientific researcher, or that C law students on average would teach advanced courses as well as A
students, or that a residency at a great teaching hospital
adds nothing to a physician's ability to practice medicine?
We suspect that radical multiculturalists are perfectly capa-

"In their conclusion, Farber and Sherry refer to the possibility of dialogue, but they
do not seek to converse with the "radical multiculturalists." They wish to engage with
those whom they refer to as constituting the "reconstructive" strand of feminism and race
theory. A handful of such scholars are named by way of example, including Lani Guinier,
Martha Minow, and Robert Gordon, although their precise relationship to the central tenets of "radical multiculturalism" remains murky. Presumably, the "radicals" are to be
banished from this ongoing dialogue (pp 140-41).
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ble of giving sensible answers to such questions, and of realizing that their theory of merit is a bit extreme. Their failure
to do so is a clue that something may have gone badly wrong
with the way this and other issues have been discussed
within the community of radical scholars (pp 72-73).
Farber and Sherry's diagnosis is that discourse has been degraded by multicultural methodology to the point where it is difficult for "radicals" to assess the merits of their own arguments.
Their argument has its ironies, for Farber and Sherry's misconstructions of the critique contribute substantially to the supposed
excesses they deride. Nevertheless, their argument about degradation bears consideration because it is so frequently repeated in
connection with the use of narrative, and because it is the sole
element of their analysis that seeks to link multiculturalism with
problems that have actually emerged in its wake.
The authors present a series of arguments about the distortion of discourse within multiculturalism. They claim that the resort to experiential narrative yields scholarship whose normative
content is either nonexistent or frustratingly indeterminate (pp
84-86). They argue that a focus on "authenticity" has replaced the
objectivist concern with the typicality of stories, and has produced
rancorous feuding over comparative injury and whose claims best
reflect group-based experience (pp 78-84). Perhaps most important, they argue that it has become nearly impossible to discuss
the content and implications of narrative because narrative
scholars respond defensively, typically claiming that critics have
replicated the insensitivity to which their stories bear witness.
Farber and Sherry note:
It's easy enough to blame this rhetorical explosion on insensitivity and aggressive over-reading on one side, or excessive
personal sensitivity on the other. But the reality is that personal storytelling raises an inevitable risk of such confrontations.... Neither in the academy or in society at large can

we always count on having friendly readers whose understanding will coincide with our own. When dealing with such
personal matters, unfavorable interpretations at odds with
the author's own perspective cannot be received as anything
other than personal attacks, and only the saintly could refrain from responding with an outcry of pain and anger (p
90).

Farber and Sherry conclude that the problem lies, if not in the
storytellers, then in the storytelling form. But, before concluding
that the answer is the abandonment of an entire genre of scholar-
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ship, one should look carefully at the kinds of challenges that
have, and have not, been offered. This inquiry may help us facilitate the communication across methodological differences that
should be our task in the final phase of the culture wars.
The vast majority of challenges to narratives concern the
truth of the experiential stories offered. Challenges have occasionally criticized the typicality of narratives, 2 but many more
have addressed whether the story happened in the way that the
author related, whether salient details have been omitted, and
what the reader is to do in the face of a story that cannot be verified according to the usual objectivist criteria. Patricia Williams
has been the most visible target of such challenges. From her editors' worries about her Benetton story,53 to Farber and Sherry's
misgivings about her treatment of Tawana Brawley (p 96), to
Mark Tushnet's challenge to her confessed complicity in an incident of anti-Semitism,' Williams has served as a lightning rod
for this category of anxieties. But similar queries in less public
venues have been raised about other storytellers. In some respects, this is not surprising. These stories are likely to be unfamiliar because they (intentionally) present perspectives at odds
with the experiences of politically or numerically dominant readers. They are also accounts that generally cannot be verified according to objectivist criteria. However, the persistent questions
about the truth of experiential narratives take on a different cast
when they are compared with the questions that are not asked,
but are instead answered by the critics themselves.
A good example concerns normativity. Critics have rarely
questioned narrative scholars, in a curious or open-minded way,
about what their narratives mean, and, more important, what
normative import the scholars hope to derive from their stories.
Like Farber and Sherry, most critics read narratives according to
their own methodological lights and conclude that the stories lack
normative import, or that the normative value is too indeterminate to be productively employed. Yet, as I have argued elsewhere, challenging traditional conceptions of legal normativity
has been an important project among narrative scholars.55 Many
See David Hyman, Lies, Damn Lies, and Narrative (forthcoming Ind L J) (demonstrating the atypicality of most prominent stories about failures to serve uninsured pa-

tients in emergency rooms).
"These challenges are recounted in Williams, Alchemy at 44-51 (cited in note 8). (The
Benetton story describes Williams's experience of being denied access to a Benetton store
on account of her race.)
"Mark Tushnet, The Degradationof ConstitutionalDiscourse, 81 Georgetown L J
251, 268-69 (1992).

' Kathryn Abrams, The Narrativeand the Normative, in Susan Heinzehnan and Zip-
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narrative scholars seek to do something other than to propose the
next three-part doctrinal test. For example, some may want to
suggest that targeting the judiciary's presuppositions is an essential prerequisite to any revisionary test they would offer;5 6 others
seek a rupture with current doctrinal verities large enough to
prompt a systematic rethinking of those verities, without necessarily suggesting where that thinking should end.57 But many
critics of narrative assume they can assess any piece of work on
the basis of their own methodological assumptions and conclude
that there is no normative undertaking to be found. In this world
of emerging normative pluralism, it would be much more productive for critics simply to ask what the narrator is attempting to
accomplish. I have argued from the first that narrative scholars
should take some responsibility for the accessibility of their messages, and that an "ethics of representation" should be developed
to prevent the misleading of readers.58 I would add to this the
suggestion that narrative scholars be more explicit about their
normative innovations. Yet these efforts cannot be a one-way
street: a genuine question from critics, rather than a curt dismissal, would encourage this practice and facilitate discussion on
the varieties of legal normativity and how they might be achieved
through scholarship.
A similar point might be made with respect to challenges to
truth. We should be concerned with the truth of narratives, but
we should also question the way that many critics have gone
about evaluating this truth. Critics have repeatedly emphasized
the claim that narratives are not true, or are not verifiable,
rather than responding to the fact that narrative scholars have
endeavored to challenge objectivist conceptions of truth. Critics
may acknowledge, as Farber and Sherry do, that there are different conceptions of truth, but they nonetheless claim that it is ir-

porah Wiseman, eds, Representing Women: Law, Literatureand Feminism 44 (Duke 1994)
(arguing that feminist legal scholarship has "challenged the methodological norms of legal
scholarship" by the use of narrative).
' See Marc Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes and Legal Protectionfor Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U Miami L Rev 511, 64950 (1992) (describing narrative as targeting the pre-understandings of the legal decisionmaker and the public).
' See Abrams, The Narrativeand the Normative at 50-52 (cited in note 55) (describing
normative function of "paradigm-shifting" narratives).
" See Abrams, 79 Cal L Rev at at 1025-26, 1046-51 (cited in note 30) (endorsing Angela Harris's call for an "ethics of representation" and advocating elaboration of the normative message of narratives). Some of the central questions such an 'ethics' would take
up are discussed at text accompanying note 31, quoting id at 1026.
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responsible to employ anything other than the dominant conception without providing fair warning."s
Sometimes, however, the decision not to identify the conception of truth that is operating is part of the methodological challenge; the narrative is intended, by its ambiguity, to challenge
readers to see that there are more conceptions of truth than they
are accustomed to thinking.
Setting aside the category of narratives in which authors use
ambiguity to communicate their challenge to method, one might
ask: what kind of scholarly universe is it in which narrative
scholars deviate from objectivist conceptions of truth only at their
peril, or with a sufficient "warning to the reader"? It is a universe
in which objectivist conceptions of truth remain a singularly
dominant norm. Yet, as I have argued above, we occupy a scholarly universe in which various forms of perspectivity have gained
increasingly broad acceptance. In this world, it would be a proper
demonstration of collegial respect to ask narrative scholars what
vision of truth is operating in their narratives. Dialogue about
conceptions of truth and how and where they operate might then
be possible. Such dialogue could help generate a broader, more
pluralist set of expectations that could govern the reading of legal
scholarship; Farber and Sherry's approach only reasserts the
narrow preexisting set.
The use of emphasis and ellipsis raises similar concerns. Few
would suggest that narrative scholars offer pure, unmediated experience. Indeed, some narrative scholars specifically call attention to the fact that they have mediated, or even struggled to mediate, a multivalent experience. 0 An "ethics of representation,"6 '
" The authors state:
When we are talking about perceptions or the recounting of a particular event, we
can distinguish among three different statements:
1. "Ifyou had been watching, this is what you would have seen."
2. "The situation might not have looked that way to you, but this is how it felt to me.'
3. "The situation didi't feel this way to me at the time, but this is how it seems to me
now."
The first statement represents the conventional view of a true or accurate account....
There is nothing wrong with any of these statements .... The problem is that the
radical multiculturalists seemingly want to use all three statements interchangeably,
with no warning to the reader .... We think readers are entitled to know which type
of statement is being made, and the radicals' casual attitude toward truth eliminates
the distinction (pp 96-97).
' See Kathryn Abrams, Unity, Narrativeand Law, 13 Stud in Law, Pol & Soc 3, 23
(1993) (describing as one category of "complex narratives" those whose authors make
manifest the process of narrative mediation).
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which considers how equivocal or multivalent experience should
be rendered and what kinds of doubts and choices should be
shared with readers, is essential in shaping this emerging new
genre of scholarship, and is underway among feminits and critical race theorists. Yet this process has received little support or
contribution from those who question the narrative form. Instead,
they offer harsh or derisive criticism centered around the apparently irresistible temptation to mislead the reader for professional or political gain. Beyond All Reason's stock story of victimization is a typical contribution in this vein. Farber and Sherry articulate what they take to be a typical narrative of race, class,
and gender victimization, which they describe as a "personal
story about one of the authors" (p 112): It begins "I grew up in a
single-parent family in New York City public housing. My mother
was an alcoholic and a compulsive gambler.

.

." (p 112). They

then elaborate on this narrative in a way that makes clear that
while "every act in the story is technically true... the story as a
whole, as well as many of its details, presents an extremely misleading portrait..." (p 113):
I grew up in a single-parent family in New York City public
housing. My'parents were divorced when I was nine. Until
then, I lived in a "traditional"family, with a father who
worked and a mother who stayed at home and took care of the
children. Even afterward, my father sent regular childsupport payments and kept in touch with us. The "public
housing" was Mitchell-Lama middle income housing which,
although it was not a five-bedroom house in the suburbs, was
not what most people think of as "the projects."
My mother was an alcoholic and a compulsive gambler ....
Her alcoholism was confined to drinking several cocktails
every evening. It never interfered with herjob or her general
ability to function. She never left us alone in order to buy or
drink alcohol, and was never so drunk that she could not respond to an emergency. Her gambling began as innocuous
weekly poker games-in which $10 was a big win or lossand did not become a problem until long after I had left
home. I never felt its effects, and indeed gave her legal advice
when casinos began pressing her to repay her debts . .. (p
113).62
, As I note in the long quote above, see text accompanying note 30, the term "ethics of
representation" is taken from Angela Harris. See Angela Harris, Notes on an Ethics of
Representation (Apr 1, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
" In the quote above, as in the original, the material that is italicized represents the
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This elaborated version continues for four pages, in every case
substantially undermining the claim made in the original story.
The authors' ostensible point is that multiculturalists cannot tell
us "why we should prefer the deconstructed version of the story to
the misleading one" (p 116).' But the larger suggestion of Farber
and Sherry's narrative is that it is seductively easy to render a
compelling narrative of victimization that happens to omit crucial
details, and that this is a temptation to which narrative scholars
might be expected to fall victim. This suggestion is troubling, for
while it adverts in fact to a universal human weakness, it seems
to target, in particular, the veracity of a particular group of
scholars. Rendered in the broad and cynical way that Farber and
Sherry have offered it, it is, moreover, deeply insulting. They
suggest that they have seen through what narrative scholars are
up to, or that they understand the risks of the form far better
than its practitioners do themselves. What is needed, I would argue, is dialogue, about the difficulties of this form and how they
might be addressed. A challenge with this tone and content shortcircuits, rather than contributes to, that dialogue.
Given these examples of opportunities missed and opportunities taken, it should not be difficult to see why narrative scholars
have responded with pain and anger to many challenges to the
form. It is also not difficult to see why narrative scholars have
seen in some of these critiques the reproduction of the racial (or
gender-based) attitudes their narratives expose. The modes of
criticizing narrative that I have illuminated above often reflect
similarities with patterns or tropes through which dominant
groups have historically discredited or -marginalized racial minorities and women. For example, the suggestion that narratives
have little normative content, that they are instead underanalyzed renditions of experience, is consonant with the construction of women and minorities as primitives, capable of pouring
forth raw experience but incapable of theorizing it." The (inconsistent) suggestion that narratives are manufactured or fantasized recalls the traditional questioning of women's claims of sex"elaboration" on the authors' stock story.
"This is, at any rate, a feeble claim because any lawyer or five-year-old, whatever her
epistempological premises, can tell you that there are statements that, while not factually
incorrect, are completely misleading when considered in light of their iffler context. Endorsing so flawed a conception of "truth," moreover, is not the narrative scholars' point. In
fact, Stanley Fish makes the point that removal of narratives from their context is not the
strategy of multiculturalists, but is instead one of the key strategies of their opponents.
See Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech at 60-61 (cited in note 2).
"Professor Anna Marie Smith has made this point, drawing on the work of Barbara
Johnson and Edward Said.
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ual injury, or the typical response of those whose assumptions are
socially dominant to anything that is inconsistent with their assumptions. The suggestion that critics understand what women
and minority scholars are doing better than the scholars themselves resonates with stereotypes about the competence of women
and minorities to perform their work and to operate in the public
world.
I do not contend that critics of narrative act on the basis of
these assumptions. The problem is not their intent but the result:
when critics forsake obvious opportunities for dialogue, responding instead with rejection that mistakes innovations for feelings
and recalls race- and gender-based slights, it is not surprising
that narrative scholars receive such criticism with less than open
arms. The mutual suspicions that surround narrative are complicated and run deep. It will take time for even curious, good-faith
engagement by critics to produce exchange. But no dialogue is
possible if critics assume, rather than ask.
Critics might also reflect on how to reformulate some of the
questions they do ask, so that they speak across the variable assumptions of an increasingly plural methodological environment.
For example, instead of asking "Is [a narrative] true?" or suggesting that it has been inappropriately mediated, critics might
ask narrative scholars what they believe to be the critical factors
that produced the event or the response on which they focus. If
appropriately framed, this might produce a discussion that would
also yield information on the typicality or incidence of the phenomenon described-a question whose importance may vary, depending on the normative purposes for which the narrative is intended.'
Critics might also reconsider the ways that they have tended
to respond to claims that their criticisms reflect the very attitudes multiculturalists have sought to expose. Critics have
viewed such responses as accusations of racism, or, in Farber and
Sherry's words, as "conversation-stopping moves" (p 74). There is
no doubt that such charges are potentially embarrassing, and
may serve to reallocate the power in a dialogue. Yet Farber and
Sherry's negative appraisal also bespeaks a singular, rather than
a plural, conceptual universe. Withdrawal in response to this
kind of criticism is based on a belief that racism (or sexism) necessarily involves the malevolent intentionalism required by the

See Abrams, 79 Cal L Rev at 1021-27 (cited in note 30) (explaining why narratives
offered for some normative purposes need to be typical and others need not).
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Supreme Court in Washington v Davis." In contrast, multiculturalism has sought to evoke racism and sexism as varied, socially
constructed phenomena that are far more difficult to avoid than
intentional discrimination. Multiculturalists have argued that we
all operate within a range of institutions, practices, and linguistic
structures that reinforce race and gender hierarchies. The demand that we resist them, under this vision, is no less stringent,
but the task is more difficult, because these attitudes are so various and subtle and can be assimilated in many different ways.
Particularly, if it is levelly communicated, the message that one
may have failed-at least temporarily-at one part of this difficult task should be received not with anger and indignation but
with regret and resolve. "Every day," as Patricia Williams says of
her own struggles with victimization and victimizing, "is a new
labor." 7
These sensitive and difficult issues await us as we enter the
late stages of the culture wars. Surveying such issues should help
us to see why Farber and Sherry's flawed and inflammatory critique moves us in precisely the wrong direction. Though the hour
is late, and the arrival long awaited, this is one train we should
not get on.

426 US 229, 239-42 (1976) (holding that evidence of racially disproportionate impact
is insufficient to prove the discriminatory purpose necessary to show an equal protection
violation).
Daniel Farber has suggested, in private correspondence with me, that my understanding of anti-Semitism, see note 36, comes closer to this intentionalist mode than to the
subtler and more inclusive way I understand racism. I am not convinced that this is true:
while the statements that I criticize (such as those of Farrakhan) display this intentional
character, those I find unproblematic (such as those of Derrick Bell) do not, in my view,
demonstrate even group-selective insensitivity. However, it would be neither surprising,
nor, I think, inappropriate if one defined particular "isms," or practices of marginalization,
differently, depending on their virulence, history, and the social position of their targets in
a particular society.
"Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on FormalEqual Opportunity, 87 Mich L Rev 2128, 2151 (1989).

